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Abstract
The Chinese government is adopting a 'going-out' strategy to promote China's 
high-end rail technology overseas and strengthen its global competitiveness. 
This article examines China's high-speed rail diplomacy towards the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and uncovers the link between China's 
ambitious foreign policies towards the ASEAN and both national pride and 
commercial stakes in promoting high-speed rail in the region. It analyses the 
rationale behind China's high-speed rail development proposals for the ASEAN 
in the context of the rise of China and rivalry between China and Japan. China 
is especially eager to participate in the construction of high-speed railroads 
with ASEAN members. The high-speed rail link can forge regional economic 
integration within the ASEAN. For ASEAN member states, China is a key exter-
nal investor and contractor for their infrastructure development. Nevertheless, 
China is facing serious challenges to the realization of its proposals.
Keywords: China, ASEAN, high-speed rail, infrastructure development, ASEAN 
connectivity, outward investment
Introduction
The rapid economic rise of China has allowed it to increase its inﬂuence 
in the development of Asia and become one of the most important actors 
in Southeast Asia, economically, politically and strategically. Bilateral 
trade between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) has grown over the last 20 years, from US$7 billion in 1990 to 
US$400 billion in 2012, a 57-fold increase. Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore 
and Thailand are China's four major trading partners (Asian Develop-
ment Bank 2012). Bilateral trade between China and the ASEAN has 
increased sharply since China became a member of the World Trade 
Organization in 2001. It is argued that the ASEAN–China Free Trade 
Area (ACFTA) will further strengthen bilateral trade cooperation and 
increase the volume of bilateral trade (Devadason 2010). The three princi-
pal channels for market-driven integration of the Chinese economy with 
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other Asian economies are viewed as trade, foreign direct investment 
and a complementary regional production network with China as the 
assembly centre and export platform for ﬁnal goods (Das 2013). China 
has proposed upgrading the ACFTA and aims to achieve bilateral trade 
worth up to US$1 trillion by 2020. At the same time, China has engaged 
in a rapidly increasing number of large-scale, contracted projects for 
transport and other crucial infrastructure development in the ASEAN 
region, including construction of roads, expressways, bridges, dams, 
port facilities and power plants. 
Previous studies on China–ASEAN relations have focused heavily 
on bilateral trade, ACFTA and territorial and maritime disputes in the 
South China Sea (SCS) between China and some ASEAN member states. 
However, the rationale behind China's high-speed rail diplomacy and 
charm offensive aimed at ASEAN members and the challenges facing 
China in achieving its ASEAN goals have rarely been examined. In ad-
dition, although ASEAN has become the major site for the high-speed 
rail contest between Japan and China, there is a lack of academic scrutiny 
of this rivalry. What is the motivation and rationale for China's high-
speed rail diplomacy towards the ASEAN? What strategy has China 
adopted to access markets for high-speed rail and other infrastructure 
development in Southeast Asia? Who are the major opponents to Chi-
na's plan to develop high-speed rail in the region? What are the major 
challenges for China's high-speed development proposals? This article 
intends to bridge this research gap by examining these issues in relation 
to the thinking behind China's eagerness to export its high-speed rail 
technology to ASEAN members, and the challenges facing implementa-
tion of its proposals.
China has made astonishing strides in the development of high-speed 
railway (known as the gaotie 中国高铁 in Chinese) over the past few 
years. Prior to 2003, China still did not have a single kilometre of high-
speed railway; now it has the world's largest high-speed rail network, 
with nearly 10,000 kilometres of track in operation by 2012 (Figure 1). 
Almost all of the provincial-level regions in China are connected by the 
high-speed rail transport network. China now leads the world in high-
speed rail development and its high-speed rail technology has become 
a global promotion brand, with great appeal for many countries. The 
fast expansion of China's high-speed railroads is attracting worldwide 
attention, with The Economist, World Bank, BBC, New York Times and Wall 
Street Journal among others having recently provided in-depth coverage 
of this signiﬁcant development and its domestic implications.1 
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With the rapid development of China's high-speed railway, it is timely 
to analyse China's eagerness to export its high-speed rail technology 
to the ASEAN. China's high-speed rail development proposals to the 
ASEAN are a reﬂection of China's economic ascendance as well as its 
growing power in the global arena. China's high-speed rail diplomacy 
to the ASEAN is viewed as a grand vision of interregional rail network 
connectivity between China and its neighbours in Asia (Reilly 2012). 
Promoting China's high-speed rail in the ASEAN region reﬂects the 
Chinese government's efforts to project China's economic might, increase 
its economic and diplomatic inﬂuence, and assert its political, strategic 
and economic interests in the ASEAN region. 
Economic prosperity is based on infrastructure development. A 
comprehensive and efﬁcient infrastructure system is crucial to un-
locking geographical constraints and achieving rapid national eco-
nomic growth. Economic geography theorists have long argued the 
importance of infrastructure development in overcoming backward 
geographic conditions and reducing the high costs of production in 
landlocked countries (Kraft, Meyer and Valette 1971; Skinner 1994; 
Radelet and Sachs 1998; Bougheas, Demetriades and Morgenroth 
FIGURE 1: The Operational Length of High-speed Rail and Railway 
Networks in China
Note: The data refers to high-speed rail networks capable of running at speeds over 200 kilome-
tres per hour.
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2012; the data on the high-speed railway was compiled by the 
author based on updated information.
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1999; Henderson, Salizi and Venables 2001). Infrastructure acts as 
a critical force to boost regional development and thereby provides 
the foundation for industrial and economic prosperity (Yu 2011). 
Infrastructure improvement can unleash development advantages 
of landlocked regions such as low labour and land costs. Modern 
infrastructure facilities are viewed as one of the most important fac-
tors in stimulating regional economic development. Conversely, the 
lack of such infrastructure can seriously deter private investors from 
investing in landlocked regions and consequently impede these re-
gions' economic growth. The experience of economic growth in the 
developed European countries, Asian countries and North America 
illustrates the importance of transport and other critical infrastructure 
development in shaping regional economic take-off and prosperity. 
For instance, Sapir's study (1990) of South Korea describes how public 
investment in infrastructure construction helped transform it from an 
economically poor to a developed nation.
Infrastructure improvement is the foundation for economic develop-
ment. Nevertheless, infrastructure, although necessary, is not the only 
requirement for pursuing economic development. Capable and efﬁcient 
institutions, educational development, availability of a skilled labour 
force, domestic savings, and provision of a pro-business investment 
environment are all necessary pre-conditions to achieving economic 
growth. The development experiences of the East Asian miracle in 
countries such as South Korea and Singapore are cases in point.
The structure of this article is as follows: the next section discusses 
China's high-speed rail diplomacy to the ASEAN. Section three examines 
the role of infrastructure development in ASEAN connectivity and the 
status of infrastructure in the ASEAN. Section four considers China's 
infrastructure development plan for the ASEAN and its rationale and 
motivation. Section ﬁve discusses the ongoing rivalry and competition 
between Japan and China in the promotion of high-speed rail in the 
region, and illustrates how China could best overcome this opposition. 
Section six provides analysis on the challenges facing implementation 
of China's proposals, with focus on the territorial conﬂicts and disputes 
in the SCS. The ﬁnal section draws conclusions. 
China's High-speed Rail Diplomacy in the ASEAN
There is a well-known saying that China has to produce and export 
millions of shirts in order to buy a Boeing or Airbus aircraft built in 
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the United States or Europe. This is a reﬂection of China's status as 
a labour-intensive and low-end manufacturing base. However, after 
30 years of huge investment in research and development activities, 
adopting learning from Western advanced technology, and develop-
ing home-grown innovation, China is apparently ready to export its 
domestically made, high-tech industrial products overseas. A trend 
of China exporting a wide range of high-end and high-tech industrial 
goods is taking shape. For example, China will collaborate with the 
French power giant EDF to build a new generation nuclear power plant 
in Hinkley Point in Somerset, Great Britain, in a deal announced by the 
British chancellor George Osborne during his visit to China in October 
2013.2 This planned new nuclear power plant will incorporate Chinese 
technology and Chinese-manufactured components.
The case of high-speed rail expertise offers a glimpse of the dramatic 
progress China has made in developing high-value-added and high-tech 
products based on the most advanced technology. The Chinese govern-
ment supports the Chinese high-speed rail manufacturing industry's 
entry into foreign markets and is promoting its high-speed rail technol-
ogy globally in Asia, Europe and the Americas, and therefore a form 
of 'high-speed rail diplomacy' has emerged. China has already signed 
a memorandum of understanding on railway sector cooperation with 
Russia, Brazil and Turkey; and in 2012, the Chinese railway companies 
won construction contracts for high-speed railway and trains in Turkey 
and Iran.3 
The new Chinese government intends to make the railway sector a top 
priority in expanding China–ASEAN cooperation, and is more willing 
than its predecessors to seek business opportunities abroad for China's 
high-speed rail technology. Hence, China is launching a charm offensive 
to show off its expertise in high-speed rail technology to the ASEAN. 
Due to its ﬁnancial resources, technological capability and abundance 
of skilled labour, China is ideally placed to take on high-speed railroad 
projects in foreign markets. 
At China's invitation, trade ministers from the ten ASEAN member 
states travelled to Beijing by high-speed train in October 2013. This move 
was intended to gain ASEAN endorsement for China's high-speed rail 
technology and increase conﬁdence in its safety. The planned construc-
tion of the Bangkok–Chiang Mai and the Kuala Lumpur–Singapore 
high-speed rail lines are critical infrastructure projects for the ASEAN 
in terms of both national and interregional connectivity. According to a 
World Bank study, the high-speed railroad can generate substantial eco-
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nomic agglomeration effects to the connected regions and thus stimulate 
their economic growth.4 China is keen to take part in the construction 
of these two high-speed railroads. 
The Kuala Lumpur–Singapore High-speed Railway
During their bilateral meeting in February 2013, Najib Razak, the 
prime minister of Malaysia, and Lee Hsien Loong, prime minister of 
Singapore, jointly announced a project to build a high-speed rail line 
(to run at 300 km/hour or above) between Kuala Lumpur (KL) and 
Singapore by 2020. The KL–Singapore high-speed railway was pro-
posed in the late 1990s. The construction cost is estimated at around 
US$13 billion. The KL–Singapore high-speed railway is intended to 
alleviate the serious intercity road congestion and to meet increasing 
transport demand between these two countries. Once completed, it is 
expected that this high-speed railway will cut the travel time between 
KL and Singapore to one and a half hours. According to the study by 
the Land Public Transport Commission of the Government of Malaysia, 
the KL–Singapore high-speed railway will also help to generate spill-
over economic effects to the surrounding cities along this rail line and 
forge closer economic cooperation between Singapore and Malaysia 
by encouraging development in the six local industrial clusters along 
the train route, namely Kuala Lumpur, Seremban, Melaka, Muar, Batu 
Pahat and Johor, Malaysia.5 China had been eyeing this 330 kilometre-
long high-speed rail project. 
The Bangkok–Chiang Mai High-speed Rail Line 
China has shown strong interest in being involved in the development 
of a high-speed rail line to connect Bangkok with Chiang Mai, Thailand. 
The proposed line will cut the travel time between these two cities to 
about three hours from the current 11-hour journey. Over the years, 
China and Thailand have developed a close strategic relationship that 
encompasses the political, economic, cultural, education and defence 
sectors, and is referred to by both the Chinese and Thai governments 
as the 'one family relationship'.6 
The Thai government is focusing on the development of mega-infra-
structure construction as the main strategy for overcoming the transport 
gridlock and accelerating the economic growth of Thailand up to 2020. 
The Thai government plans to spend US$60 billion on projects such as 
high-speed rail to modernize its ageing transportation facilities and 
increase the connectivity and accessibility of its cities.7 
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During Chinese Premier Li Keqiang's visit to Thailand in October 
2013, Premier Li and his Thai counterpart Yingluck Shinawatra jointly 
attended the opening ceremony of an exhibition on China's high-speed 
railways. Li played the role of super salesperson in promoting China's 
high-speed rail technology to Yingluck and the Thai public during this 
occasion. The Chinese and Thai governments signed an agreement in 
principle on railway sector cooperation in October 2013. China has 
already completed the ﬁeld geological surveys along this proposed 
high-speed rail route, which has made the state-owned China Railway 
Corporation, the world's largest railway company, the front-runner to 
bid for the Bangkok–Chiang Mai high-speed rail project. The estimated 
construction cost of this fast rail line is about US$12.8 billion.8 
Role and Status of Infrastructure Development in 
ASEAN Connectivity
In pursuing economic take-off, many ASEAN countries have faced 
the common challenge of backward and shoddy infrastructure. The 
standard of their infrastructure in terms of the 2013 global competitive 
index on infrastructure development is provided in Table 1. To unlock 
their development potential, these countries have to undertake the 
urgent task of accelerating infrastructure development and improve 
interregional infrastructure connectivity. This process offers a huge 
market for those Chinese companies that have the advanced technology 
and experience to carry out international infrastructure construction 
projects. Hence, China is eager to gain wide access to the ASEAN's 
infrastructure market. 
A well-developed transportation network can help to forge an in-
tegrated national market, and is key to developing an interregional 
economic community across the ASEAN. The availability of a well-con-
nected interregional infrastructure network is a critical pre-condition 
to full realization of the physical element of the ASEAN's Connectiv-
ity Master Plan9 and achieving the goal of the ASEAN community 
by 2015. It is important for boosting intraregional and interregional 
trade, and economic as well as cultural linkages. In particular, the 
ASEAN Master Plan has identiﬁed the development of interregional 
railroads (the so-called Singapore Kunming Rail Link, SKRL) as one 
of the priority projects. The various SKRL routes will pass through 
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam 
and Kunming, China. 
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High-speed rail has been used mainly to serve the passenger trafﬁc 
network, rather than goods transportation. Compared to other transport 
modes such as conventional railway, road and maritime shipping, the 
relatively high cost of using high-speed railway makes it less competi-
tive for cargo goods transport. The importance of high-speed rail is to 
facilitate communication among people and reduce their travel time. 
Taking this into account, the increase in trade and subsequent con-
struction of transportation infrastructure is not linked directly to the 
development of the high-speed rail network, but to other types of trans-
portation. The high-speed railway is symbolic in that it has played a 
very limited role in promoting trade and facilitating the ﬂow of goods. 
Nevertheless, high-speed rail still has a role to play and is an important 
step in developing a comprehensive and integrated transport network 
connecting China and the ASEAN countries. 
The infrastructure development gap among ASEAN members is strik-
ing. While a few countries, such as Singapore, have developed state-of-
the-art, modern infrastructure, other relatively underdeveloped member 
states, such as the Philippines, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia, use out-
dated and inefﬁcient transportation and other infrastructure facilities. 
They are unable to meet the infrastructure demands of their increasing 
middle-class populations and the rapid urbanization within the region. 
By 2020, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia will between 
them have 40 million new urban residents.10 The ASEAN countries are 
faced with the challenging task of upgrading road, air transport, port and 
railroad infrastructure that is totally inadequate. According to the global 
competitiveness index published by the World Economic Forum in 2013, 
Singapore was one of the world's leaders in infrastructure development. 
Malaysia also performed consistently well in terms of various indicators 
of infrastructure quality, although there is some room for improvement. 
Nevertheless, the majority of ASEAN member nations come out very 
poorly in international comparisons of quality of infrastructure. This is 
especially true of Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia and 
Myanmar, with Myanmar being one of the lowest-ranked countries in 
the world for most of the infrastructure quality indicators (Table 1).
As their existing infrastructure was built a long time ago, many 
ASEAN member states urgently need to upgrade their existing trans-
portation facilities and construct new infrastructure projects in order 
to boost economic growth and realize their development potential. A 
case in point is Thailand, where there is growing concern among the 
domestic and foreign business communities over the adverse effect 
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that poor infrastructure is having on industrial operations. Accord-
ing to Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates, the Asian countries 
will need to invest US$8 trillion in national infrastructure and another 
US$290 billion in interregional infrastructure construction between 2010 
and 2020 to realize Asian growth prospects.11 It is anticipated that the 
ten ASEAN countries will require a large share of this estimated infra-
structure investment. According to Goldman Sachs' estimate (2013),12 
Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia (the ASEAN-4) will need 
up to US$550 billion in investment between 2013 and 2020; the railroad 
sector alone will need US$119 billion in investment, accounting for 22 
per cent of the total projected investment needs. 
Building high-speed railways will help ASEAN members reduce 
interregional transport cost and journey time for passenger trafﬁc and 
facilitate the free communication of people. It will enhance regional 
connectivity while also forging economic integration within the ASEAN 
region. However, many ASEAN countries lack sufﬁcient ﬁnancial re-
sources to fund large-scale infrastructure projects. In addition, as they 
are characterized by long implementation periods, high ﬁnancial and 
political risks as well as uncertain economic returns, mega-scale infra-
structure projects tend to have difﬁculty attracting private investment. 
ASEAN members so far have been able to secure a few million dollars 
in funding for the interregional infrastructure projects outlined in the 
Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (the Master Plan).13 It needs to look 
TABLE 1: Infrastructure Performance of ASEAN Members in the 
2013-2014 Global Competitiveness Index (based on ranking 
of 148 countries/economies)
Country
Quality 
of overall 
infra-
structure
Quality of 
roads
Quality of 
railroad 
infra-
structure
Quality of 
port infra-
structure
Quality of 
air trans-
port infra-
structure
Quality of 
electricity 
supply
Singapore 5 7 10 2 1 8
Malaysia 25 23 18 24 20 37
Brunei 39 35 n/a 49 55 59
Thailand 61 42 72 56 34 58
Indonesia 82 78 44 89 68 89
Philippines 98 87 89 116 113 93
Vietnam 110 102 58 98 92 95
Laos 65 65 n/a 137 76 61
Cambodia 86 80 91 81 90 112
Myanmar 146 138 104 136 146 118
Source: World Economic Forum (2013).
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for other reliable external sources of funding. The ASEAN is fully aware 
that it needs foreign investment for its infrastructure modernization. As 
stated in the Master Plan:
ASEAN will further strengthen partnership with external partners, 
including Dialogue Partners, multilateral development banks, international 
organizations and others for effective and efﬁcient implementation of the 
Master Plan. (pp. ii-iii)14
Against this backdrop, the ADB invested US$7.32 billion in the ASEAN 
countries for projects on poverty reduction and infrastructure develop-
ment in 2012. Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand are the three largest 
recipients of ADB loans in the region, receiving 14.4, 6.0 and 6.3 per cent 
of the ADB's total lending respectively. However, the ADB invested 
relatively little in Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia and Myanmar (Table 2). 
China's High-speed Rail Development Proposals for the 
ASEAN
The Rationale behind China's Proposals for the Region
In recent years, the Chinese government has encouraged Chinese com-
panies to invest overseas, expand their foreign markets and develop 
strategic resources to sustain domestic economic growth. The ASEAN 
countries have become an important recipient of the investment from 
China. According to data issued by the Heritage Foundation of the 
United States, Chinese companies spent US$386.7 billion in outward 
investment between 2005 and 2012, a trend that is likely to continue 
over the next decade. During this period, Chinese companies made huge 
investments in outward transport and other infrastructure construction 
amounting to about US$138.8 billion, exceeded only by investment in 
the energy and power sector.15 
China's high-speed rail diplomacy to the ASEAN is pragmatic, being 
politically as well as economically motivated. First, diplomatically, the 
Chinese government has reiterated that China aims to promote coopera-
tion and common development with neighbouring countries, rather than 
seeking regional hegemony.16 China's ability to export its high-speed rail 
expertise to the ASEAN and its acceptance by ASEAN members will be 
a major test of China's capacity to further strengthen its economic and 
strategic cooperation with member states and testify to China's long-held 
'friendly and good neighbourhood' policy in the context of the rise of 
China. During the visit of China's president, Xi Jinping to Indonesia in 
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October 2013, he noted to the Indonesian Parliament that 'China would 
like to expand cooperation with the ASEAN countries in all aspects, 
to share development opportunities with the ASEAN countries and 
stand shoulder to shoulder to meet challenges, and pursue common 
development and prosperity.'17 From the external perspective, China 
is using its advanced high-speed rail expertise as a diplomatic tool 
to serve its foreign policy and enhance its own national interests and 
regional inﬂuence. Second, from a political perspective, by promoting 
bilateral high-speed rail and other forms of infrastructure cooperation, 
China seeks to soften its hard-line tone on territorial disputes with other 
member states of the ASEAN, and strengthen mutual trust between the 
various parties. Third, the high-speed railroad provides China with new 
opportunities to engage with the ASEAN member states and pursue its 
national economic interests abroad. China's initiative to build high-speed 
railroads will help forge closer economic cooperation between China 
and the ASEAN. China is keen to aid ASEAN countries in modernizing 
their infrastructure and hence supports the participation of Chinese 
companies in ASEAN infrastructure development projects.18 
The huge and unexplored infrastructure market in general and the 
high-speed railway market in particular in the ASEAN offer not only 
enormous business opportunities for China's infrastructure construction 
companies, but they will also boost the export of high-speed railway 
technology, high-end railway-related equipment and components by 
Chinese manufacturing ﬁrms to the ASEAN, supported by concessional 
TABLE 2: Loan Approvals to Southeast Asian Nations by the Asian 
Development Bank, 2012
Country
Total value of approval 
lending (US$ billion)
As a percentage of total 
lending by the ADB 
Cambodia 350.8 1.6
Indonesia 1.287.6 6.0
Laos 144.5 0.7
Malaysia 0.3 0
Myanmar 5.4 0
Philippines 1,063.2 4.9
Thailand 1,360.4 6.3
Vietnam 3,112.0 14.4
ADB Total 21,571.3 100
Note: Total value of loan approval by the bank covers its Ordinary Capital Resources (OCR), 
ADB Special Funds and Co-ﬁnancing.  
Source: Statement of the Asian Development Bank's Operations in 2012, p. 7.
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loans and development assistance. Such exports to the Southeast Asian 
countries will help China deal with its production overcapacity in the rail 
sector and boost its manufacturing industries and domestic economy. 
As the domestic economy slows, the fast expansion of high-speed 
railway in China is also likely to slow down. China already has the 
world's largest high-speed rail network, with nearly 10,000 kilometres 
of track in operation by 2012. There is limited scope for further high-
speed rail development in China. Given the seriousness of the manu-
facturing overcapacity issue, China has to look for foreign markets for 
its high-speed rail products and associated technology to support its 
wide-ranging industrial sectors. Against this backdrop, the Chinese 
government in the past several years has adopted a 'going-out' strategy 
to promote China's high-end and high-value-added manufacturing in-
dustries overseas and strengthen the global competitiveness of China's 
industrial products. 
The main purpose of China's high-speed rail diplomacy is to safe-
guard its national economic interests in terms of supporting China's 
outward investments, restructuring industrial development by sup-
porting industrial upgrading towards high-value-added products, as 
well as boosting domestic manufacturing-led economic growth. China's 
high-speed rail industry has vital linkages to the various upstream and 
downstream sectors, including steel, cement and high-end equipment 
manufacturing industries. 
Rivalry between China and Japan over the ASEAN High-
speed Rail Sector
Relations between China and Japan, which were already notoriously 
difﬁcult due to the historical issue of Japan's wartime atrocities and 
invasion of China (Beeson and Li 2012), have soured further in recent 
years mainly due to the ongoing territorial disputes over the Diaoyu/
Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. China and Japan have engaged 
in ﬁerce international competition in political, economic, security and 
defence arenas since the nationalization of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
by the Japanese government in 2010. China and Japan both claim these 
disputed islands as their sovereign territory. 
These two countries are also engaged in rivalry over regional lead-
ership in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN, comprising Japan and China's 
neighbouring countries, has become the major battleﬁeld on which each 
of these two main Asian powers is desperately trying to solicit support 
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against the other. The ASEAN as the major site for contestation provides 
a glimpse of the ﬁerce competition between Japan and China. China's 
competition with Japan over high-speed rail exempliﬁes this battle. 
Through its high-speed rail diplomacy with ASEAN members, China 
seeks to wrest regional inﬂuence from Japan and to shape the Asian 
power structure. Meanwhile, with its increasing economic dependence 
on China, the ASEAN does not want to become embroiled in any conﬂict 
between Japan and China. 
Japan once was a dominant player in the region. As it is the larg-
est donor of ofﬁcial development assistance to the ASEAN, Japan has 
established strong bilateral relationships with the ASEAN states. For 
years, Japanese companies invested more heavily than China in the 
ASEAN in a wide range of ﬁelds including infrastructure development, 
manufacturing industries, human resource development, education and 
poverty reduction. Nevertheless, China's investment in Laos, Cambodia 
and Myanmar has exceeded that of Japan, with much of this investment 
devoted to transport and other infrastructure construction in these 
Mekong countries. Hence, from an economic perspective, they have 
formed strong bonds with China (Chug 2011). 
Despite being a relative latecomer to the region, China has successfully 
caught up with Japan in terms of economic cooperation and integration 
with the ASEAN. Signiﬁcantly, China was the ﬁrst country to propose 
and sign a free trade agreement (FTA) with the ASEAN. China has 
overtaken Japan to become the largest trade partner for the ASEAN 
since 2009. In addition, the rise of China to replace Japan as the world's 
second largest economy in 2010 has caused much upset, fear and anxiety 
among many Japanese, who consider China as posing the most serious 
threat to Japan. China, meanwhile, has ﬂexed its new economic power 
vis-à-vis Japan by providing signiﬁcant amounts of economic assistance 
to the ASEAN nations and ﬁnancing many large-scale intraregional and 
interregional infrastructure projects.
China has asserted its increasing economic power through high-speed 
rail and its other economic interests in Southeast Asia. However, Japan 
is a long-standing global leader in the ﬁeld of high-speed rail expertise, 
due to its Shinkansen (bullet train), and it is thus hard for Japan to ac-
cept China's newfound international supremacy in the ﬁeld of high-
speed rail. The expanding inﬂuence of China's high-speed rail poses 
a challenge to Japan's economic and political inﬂuence in the ASEAN, 
demonstrating the continuing rivalry between the two nations over 
regional inﬂuence in the ASEAN. Japan opposes China's high-speed 
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rail development proposal for the ASEAN, and is determined to resist 
Chinese expansion of high-speed rail in the region. 
Japan has played a very active role in infrastructure development in 
the ASEAN over the last several decades; for example, it has long been an 
important partner with Thailand in projects such as the Bangkok metro 
system, and is seeking to export its bullet train to Thailand. Moreover, 
during his visit to Malaysia in July 2013, the Japanese prime minister 
Shinzo Abe expressed Japan's concern to safeguard the construction 
contract for the KL-Singapore high-speed railroad project.19 For ASEAN, 
the use of Japanese technology to build their high-speed railroads has 
great appeal as it is perceived to be superior to Chinese technology. In 
addition, the trump card for Japan's ASEAN high-speed diplomacy is 
that Japan is not perceived to be a security threat to the region, as it has 
not entered into territorial disputes with any member state. 
Meanwhile, Japan has serious concerns over China's increasing in-
ﬂuence and active role in the ASEAN, and the Japanese government 
is determined to match China's effort to consolidate its interests in the 
region. Prime Minister Abe has demonstrated his resolve to use foreign 
policies to strengthen Japan's long-held economic and political ties with 
the ASEAN member states, and rally ASEAN bloc solidarity to coun-
terbalance the rise of China's inﬂuence in the region. 
Japan's interests in the ASEAN relate not only to high-speed rail and 
other commercial sectors, but also broad political, security and strategic 
dimensions. Japan seeks to turn the ASEAN into an economic and dip-
lomatic hedge opposing China (Zhao 2013). Since Abe came to power in 
December 2012, he has visited all of the ten ASEAN member states within 
one year in a clear attempt to strengthen bilateral relations at China's 
expense. He visited Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam in January 2013 
and travelled to Myanmar in May of the same year. In July, he visited 
Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. He returned to the region to 
visit Brunei, Cambodia and Laos in October. Abe's frequent visits to the 
ASEAN countries are viewed as network diplomacy and as an important 
part of Japan's China-encirclement policy (Inoguchi 2014). 
China and Japan, as the two major Asian powers, are in direct competi-
tion in soliciting support from the ASEAN bloc by offering ﬁnancial aid 
and loans. The Japan–ASEAN summit conducted in Tokyo in Decem-
ber 2013 to mark the 40th anniversary of Japan–ASEAN relations, was 
notable for the efforts by Japan to match and directly oppose China's 
infrastructure plan for the ASEAN. During this summit, Prime Minister 
Abe pledged a package amounting to US$20 billion to the ASEAN over 
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the next ﬁve years, much of which would be in the form of concessional 
loans.20 Much of this ﬁnancial package will be channelled into infrastruc-
ture construction in the region. In addition, Japan gave US$53 million 
and sent 1,000 troops to the Philippines for infrastructure reconstruc-
tion and disaster relief after the devastation there caused by Typhoon 
Haiyan.21 Moreover, Japan has offered US$610 million to Myanmar for 
infrastructure development. 
Such a strategy by Japan, on the one hand, seeks to forge a united 
front with the ASEAN against China in exchange for Japan's ﬁnancial 
assistance. Member states of the ASEAN such as Vietnam, Philippines 
and Malaysia are the primary targets for Japan, and each of these na-
tions has maritime disputes with China in the SCS. On the other hand, 
the Abe administration anticipates that aiding ASEAN infrastructure 
development and the promotion of high-speed rail technology in this 
region will help to stimulate Japan's exports and economic growth and 
this represents part of Abe's strategy to revive the stagnating Japanese 
economy. 
However, despite the diplomatic and economic efforts made by 
the Japanese government and Abe himself, Japan has not sold its 
Shinkansen trains to any other country to date. With reference to the 
ASEAN countries discussed, countries such as Malaysia and Thailand 
have merely acknowledged Japan's capability regarding advanced 
high-speed railway technology and encouraged Japanese companies 
to participate in bidding for high-speed railway construction projects 
in their countries. 
Overcoming this strong disposition towards Japanese technology 
and Japan's efforts to oppose China's proposal to the ASEAN will be a 
challenging task for China. Nevertheless, China has three trump cards 
to play in attempting to overcome Japan's opposition. First, China is 
a rising global economic power with huge capital reserves and other 
ﬁnancial resources. During high-proﬁle trips to ﬁve ASEAN countries 
in October 2013, President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang of China, 
announced China's plan to establish the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB) to ﬁnance Asian infrastructure development and support 
Chinese ﬁrms in expanding into high-speed rail and other infrastruc-
ture markets in the ASEAN. ASEAN connectivity-related infrastructure 
projects will be the bank's priority. China's capability to offer loans to 
the ASEAN and establish the AIIB is a reﬂection of its growing economic 
power. Furthermore, the AIIB seeks primarily to compete rather than 
collaborate with the Japanese-controlled ADB in future.  
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The ADB, founded in 1966 and based in the Philippines, has tradition-
ally been the major player in funding poverty reduction and infrastruc-
ture construction projects in Asian countries at concessional rates and 
terms. Japan and the United States are the two largest shareholders in 
the ADB, with each accounting for 15.6 per cent of ADB shareholdings 
in 2012. On the other hand, China is only the third largest shareholder 
in the bank, with 6.4 per cent of shareholdings, which is less than half 
of those of Japan and the United States (Table 3)
The current president and chairperson of the board of directors of 
the ADB is Takehiko Nakao, who is Japanese. China is unhappy with 
TABLE 3: Asian Development Bank Shareholdings (31 December 
2012)
Member states Shareholdings (%)
Japan 15.6
United States 15.6
China 6.4
India 6.3
Australia 5.8
Indonesia 5.4
Canada 5.2
South Korea 5.0
Germany 4.3
Malaysia 2.7
Philippines 2.4
France 2.3
Pakistan 2.2
United Kingdom 2.0
Italy 1.8
New Zealand 1.5
Thailand 1.4
Taiwan 1.1
Others 13.0
Source: ADB Financial Proﬁle (2013: 8).
Japan's control over the loan operations, investment priorities and 
other operational aspects of the bank. In 2009, for instance, the ADB 
approved a loan to a controversial water management project located 
in the border area between China and India. It triggered strong protest 
from China. The Chinese government is seeking to establish a similar 
development bank that would focus on Asian infrastructure develop-
ment. This bank could be controlled by China, with other Asian countries 
able to participate. 
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The Chinese government aims to forge a close strategic partnership 
with the ASEAN, based not on rhetoric but on tangible infrastructure and 
trade cooperation. China has proposed to upgrade the China–ASEAN 
Free Trade Area and aims to achieve bilateral trade worth up to US$1 
trillion by 2020; this will help increase the already burgeoning economic 
integration between China and the ASEAN.22 China's initiative for 
setting up the AIIB has been widely welcomed by the ASEAN states, 
including key members such as Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia. The 
ASEAN knows that it needs China's ﬁnancial aid to hasten its infrastruc-
ture development and China is replacing Japan as the most important 
source of investment and loans for infrastructure development in the 
ASEAN. In fact, China has given more aid and loans to the ASEAN 
than other regional and international banking organizations such as 
the ADB and World Bank since the outbreak of the economic crisis in 
2008. The ongoing global economic downturn further endorses Chi-
na's importance in boosting infrastructure development and economic 
growth in the ASEAN. 
However, funding infrastructure development is a complicated task, 
and it could bring serious political and economic risks. Transforming 
the proposed AIIB into a professional investment bank will require 
considerable expertise and credibility, both of which will take time to 
develop. The Japanese-controlled ADB has had a presence in the ASEAN 
for decades by offering billions of dollars of loans and aid to the under-
developed ASEAN members for transportation, other infrastructure and 
anti-poverty development projects. Taking this into account, it will take 
years for the AIIB to be able to compete with the ADB's expertise and 
well-established investment network within the ASEAN. 
Second, the superiority of China's high-speed rail technology lies in 
its speed and its green credentials in terms of low carbon emissions and 
energy conservation (Yu and Yang 2011). China has achieved rapid de-
velopment in high-speed railway technology at competitive prices. For 
example, compared to the construction cost of around US$50 million per 
kilometre for Japan's bullet train, China can provide high-speed rail for 
up to one-third less in price per kilometre, at about US$33 million.
Third, compared to Japan, China is willing to be ﬂexible regarding 
loan repayments for high-speed rail from the receiving countries. Thai-
land, for instance, in the face of public ﬁnancial constraints, is seeking 
to make a partial payment to China to build its high-speed railway in 
the barter form of agricultural products (e.g. rice).23 China has agreed 
to this so-called 'rice for high-speed rail' deal and will import 1 million 
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tonnes of Thai rice and more rubber from Thailand over the next ﬁve 
years. Compared to the rice produced in countries such as Vietnam and 
India, the price of Thai rice is internationally uncompetitive due to the 
controversial scheme introduced by the Thai government in October 
2011 to support local farmers by buying their rice at well above market 
prices. Thailand has therefore found it difﬁcult to sell its rice in the in-
ternational market, resulting in record stockpiles of rice amounting to 
16 million tonnes.24 However, the details of this proposed high-speed 
rail deal between the Chinese and Thai governments remain unknown. 
The two governments have to work together on the payment details and 
make this barter deal workable.
Challenge to China's ASEAN High-speed Rail 
Development Proposals 
The major challenge to China's ambitious proposals for high-speed rail 
and other infrastructure investment in the ASEAN is political rather than 
economic. China's economic power is rising and cooperation with the 
ASEAN on infrastructure and trade is increasing, while mutual political 
trust between the ASEAN and China is quite low. Many ASEAN mem-
ber states have raised serious concerns that China's political ambitions 
and regional hegemony are undermining their freedom of action and 
political autonomy.25 The ASEAN has expressed concern over the lack of 
transparency of the Chinese leaders' decision-making process, while the 
perceived opacity of China's political system has impeded China's efforts 
to gain trust within this region (Yahuda 2013). Indeed, the ASEAN has 
warned that China's involvement in large-scale infrastructure develop-
ment could potentially have a negative impact on regional security. 
One concern for the ASEAN is that China-funded, large-scale in-
frastructure projects have often come with a large number of Chinese 
engineers and manufacturing workers. As shown in cases in Africa, 
these infrastructure projects have rarely employed local workers, and 
the Chinese infrastructure companies have shown little interest in 
training local workers or transferring advanced technologies to lo-
cal partners. It should be noted that much of the equipment used by 
Chinese companies for infrastructure construction projects abroad is 
sourced domestically in China. Thus, local communities and industries 
within the ASEAN might not reap much economic beneﬁt from the 
construction of high-speed railroads and other large-scale infrastructure 
projects funded by China.  
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The most serious challenge facing China is the ongoing territorial 
disputes and maritime conﬂicts in the SCS. Based on its self-proclaimed, 
so-called 'nine dotted line', China asserts that most of the islands in the 
SCS, along with their surrounding waters and resources, have been an in-
alienable part of its territorial sovereignty since ancient times. However, 
the Paracel/Xisha and Spratly/Nansha Islands and their surrounding 
waters in the SCS are all claimed by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, 
Brunei and Malaysia individually, while China has conducted several 
naval exercises in the SCS since 2010. China's assertiveness in claims of 
territorial sovereignty and maritime disputes in the area since 2009 has 
set off alarm bells for many ASEAN countries, such as the Philippines 
and Vietnam. China's relations with the Philippines have deteriorated 
over recent years. In May 2014, the Philippines condemned China's 
action on land reclamation to build new facilities on a SCS reef that is 
the subject of a dispute between the two countries.26 On 11 May 2014, 
several large-scale rallies and protests took place in Vietnam's major 
cities, including Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City,27 where people vented 
their anger over a deep-water oil drilling operation conducted by a 
state-owned Chinese company in disputed waters of the SCS.28 
Some scholars argue that the prospects for resolution of the SCS 
sovereignty conﬂicts are limited (Yahuda 2013: 455-456). China and 
the ASEAN member states have yet to start negotiating a legally bind-
ing document of maritime code of conduct to manage the conﬂicts and 
territorial disputes in the SCS. Although the Philippines and Vietnam 
prefer to emphasize ASEAN centrality (Scott 2012) and the key role 
ASEAN has to play in resolving the SCS territorial disputes with China, 
China insists that the SCS issue cannot be dealt with between China 
and the ASEAN as a group. The Chinese government has stubbornly 
insisted on the principle of dealing with SCS territorial disputes with 
the ASEAN member states on an individual bilateral basis and has re-
jected multilateral negotiations via the ASEAN. The ongoing territorial 
disputes and maritime interests between the ASEAN and China in the 
region surrounding the SCS thus are seen as the major obstacle to the 
deepening of bilateral relationships (Yeoh 2011), and could have long-
term negative repercussions for relations between China and Southeast 
Asia (see for example, Li 2010). 
ASEAN members have consequently become very wary of any move 
made by China in the region. From the ASEAN perspective, China's 
growing military power, especially the building of a blue-water navy, is 
widely perceived as a form of deterrence to endorse its sovereignty claim 
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over the SCS. As Ho's study (2001) rightly points out, China's vast size, 
huge market potential and growing military capabilities have presented 
both opportunities and threats to the ASEAN. Taking this into account, 
the ASEAN welcomes the United States' 'pivot to Asia' strategy as a 
hedge or counterbalance against the rise of China, while China views 
the actions and maritime claims by the Philippines and Vietnam on the 
SCS as a challenge to its territorial integrity and 'core interest'. 
In addition, despite pledges by the leaders of both China and the 
ASEAN member states to strengthen bilateral cooperation, China–
ASEAN relations remain quite fragile and are characterized by areas of 
contention and competition. The 'China threat' is still rooted in the men-
tality of many local people in this region. Economic and trade relations 
between China and the ASEAN are regarded as competitive rather than 
complementary, taking into account similarities in their development 
stage and in trade and industrial structure (Wong and Chan 2003). Ac-
cording to Wong and Chan (2003: 519), 'As is already occurring, ASEAN 
economies are facing competitive pressures from China, which is fast 
becoming a manufacturing threat to many Asian countries, not just in 
low-tech areas but also in some high-tech sectors.' 
This is certainly true for the labour-intensive and low-end manufac-
turing industries in the Philippines and Indonesia, which are losing out 
to competition from China. The ASEAN member states have seen their 
export market share in Western industrialized countries decline in the 
face of cheap manufactured products made in China (Ravenhill 2006). 
China faces challenges in engaging in high-speed railway and other 
infrastructure development in the ASEAN market unless it can convince 
the ASEAN member states that its proposals are purely commercial and 
can successfully present economic cooperation as a win–win situation. 
Currently academia and the local media in the ASEAN fear that China's 
high-speed rail proposals for the region, although not competing directly 
with low-end local industries in the ASEAN, might endanger and even 
destroy local manufacturing businesses in this region.
Conclusion
Accompanying China's astounding emergence as the world's leading 
player in high-speed rail development projects, the Chinese govern-
ment has adopted a 'going-out' strategy and actively promoted China's 
high-speed rail technology in foreign markets. China is eager to get 
involved in the construction of high-speed railroads in the ASEAN as 
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an endorsement of its status as a credible international player in the 
high-speed rail industry. 
China and Japan, meanwhile, are engaging in a ﬁerce contest in South-
east Asia. China faces a challenging task in seeing off competition with 
Japan over ASEAN infrastructure development, with the latter making 
every effort to match China's plans. In the face of Japanese rivalry over 
the high-speed rail sector in the region, China has various advantages 
over Japan. China can construct and operate high-speed rail at much 
lower cost than the Japanese. In addition, China's announcement of its 
plan to establish the AIIB to ﬁnance ASEAN connectivity-related infra-
structure projects and offer further ﬁnancial aid to the ASEAN countries 
has been welcomed by the ASEAN and has increased China's chances 
of participating in the ASEAN high-speed rail market. This trend of 
high-tech Chinese exports to other nations is likely to continue in the 
coming decade. 
Nevertheless, China is facing serious challenges to implementing its 
plan for the ASEAN. Although there is close bilateral trade cooperation, 
political trust between China and the ASEAN is relatively low due to on-
going maritime disputes in the SCS and China's growing military power. 
China has to convince the ASEAN member states that infrastructure 
cooperation between China and the ASEAN is a win–win situation. 
Thailand is an inﬂuential country within the ASEAN region and plays 
an important role in the development of China–ASEAN rail infrastruc-
ture cooperation. The above-mentioned SKRL is a ﬂagship project for 
the ASEAN's connectivity goal, and, whichever of the proposed eastern 
or western routes is chosen, it has to go through Thailand. Thailand 
is located at a strategic crossing point for the interregional rail link 
within the ASEAN. This is a further incentive for China to achieve a 
breakthrough in Thailand by engaging in the building of high-speed 
railroads in this region. If China successfully bids for the construction 
of the Bangkok–Chiang Mai rail line, it will be a symbolic landmark, 
both for China in accessing the ASEAN infrastructure market and for 
overseas expansion by China's infrastructure companies. 
Dr. Hong Yu is Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute, National 
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